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Under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001, high schools that receive
federal funds must provide certain student contact information to military recruiters
upon request and must allow recruiters to have the same access to students as employers
and colleges. However, at least one bill (H.R. 551) introduced in the 109th Congress
would amend these requirements. This report describes these new requirements and
discusses the legal issues that they may raise.
When Congress enacted the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001,1  it added
several new requirements regarding the ability of military recruiters to access student
information and to approach students directly. These new provisions, which are unrelated
to similar provisions requiring colleges and universities that receive federal funds to allow
military recruiters on campus,2 have proven to be somewhat controversial. Proponents of
the recruitment provisions argue that the new law allows recruiters to inform students
about the military opportunities available to them and eases the task of recruiting
volunteers to sustain the nation’s military forces. On the other hand, opponents contend
that the provisions raise concerns about student privacy and should be changed to make
it easier to opt out.3 Currently, 95% of the country’s school districts are estimated to be
complying with the new requirements,4 although it is important to note that, traditionally,
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most schools had already allowed military recruiters to contact students long before the
NCLBA provisions became mandatory.5
The new NCLBA military recruitment provisions require high schools that receive
federal funds to meet two requirements. First, such schools must “provide, on a request
made by military recruiters..., access to secondary school students names, addresses, and
telephone listings,”6 and second, schools must “provide military recruiters the same access
to secondary school students as is provided generally to post secondary educational
institutions or to prospective employers of those students.”7 Schools that fail to comply
with either of these two requirements — access to student information or equal access to
students themselves — risk losing federal funds. However, private secondary schools that
maintain a religious objection to military service are exempt from the recruitment
provisions.8
Access to Student Information
As noted above, schools must, when requested, provide military recruiters with
information concerning student names, addresses, and telephone numbers. Unlike more
personal information such as Social Security numbers, this type of data is not protected
by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),9 which currently allows the
release of student directory information in the absence of parental objections.10 Thus, even
before the NCLBA provisions were enacted, such student contact information was
potentially available to outside entities.
Like FERPA, the NCLBA also provides the opportunity to opt out of the provisions
requiring the release of directory information to military recruiters. Under the NCLBA,
students or their parents may request that the student’s directory information not be
released without prior written consent. In addition, the local educational agency or private
school must notify parents of their right to make such a request.11
Schools appear to have interpreted these opt out provisions in a variety of ways. For
example, some schools have, as part of their compliance with an array of privacy laws,
issued a general notice informing parents that they can opt out of the release of student
contact information, while other schools have issued a separate and more explicit notice
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informing parents that such information may be released to the military for recruitment
purposes if the parents do not opt out. Both of these types of notice appear to meet the
statutory requirement regarding informing parents of their right to opt out, but recipients
of the latter type of notice may be more likely to exercise that option. As a result, the type
of notice that a school elects to provide has been a subject of debate.12
In addition, the notification provision has become controversial in part because
schools have interpreted parental responses in different ways. For example, if parents fail
to respond to the notice informing them of their right to opt out of the release of student
information, some schools interpret the lack of response as indicating that the parent does
not wish to opt out, while other schools interpret a lack of response as signifying that the
parent does want to opt out. As a result, some interest groups have pressed legislators to
clarify the law with regard to this point,13 and at least one bill — H.R. 551 — introduced
in the 109th Congress would amend the law to require parents to opt in instead of opting
out of the release of student contact information.
Equal Access to Students
In addition to requiring schools to provide access to student information, the NCLBA
also requires schools to provide access to students themselves. Specifically, schools must
provide military recruiters the same access to students as is otherwise provided to other
recruiters, such as private employers or institutions of higher education.14 As with the
notification provisions, schools have implemented the equal access provisions in a variety
of ways. For example, some schools allow extensive access, permitting recruiters to set
up information tables, visit classrooms, and freely approach students anywhere on
campus. Other schools permit a lesser degree of access, and some restrict military access
even further by forbidding information tables, requiring appointments before recruiters
can meet students, and otherwise limiting access to campus.15 Despite these variations in
school policy, schools are allowed to place as many or as few restrictions as they wish on
military recruiters, as long as schools treat such recruiters the same way they treat other
entities that wish to contact students.
Legal Concerns
As noted previously, some opponents of the NCLBA military recruitment provisions
have raised legal concerns about the new requirements. In particular, some critics have
questioned whether the recruitment provisions violate a student’s right to privacy, but
neither statutory nor constitutional analysis appears to support this argument. Indeed, from
a statutory perspective, the NCLBA provisions regarding release of student contact
information are, as noted above, entirely consistent with FERPA, the longstanding law
that protects the educational privacy rights of students. Likewise, the NCLBA military
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recruitment provisions, for the reasons discussed below, do not appear to raise
constitutional concerns. 
Under the auspices of the 14th Amendment,16 the Supreme Court has recognized that
there is a constitutional right to privacy that protects against certain governmental
disclosures of personal information,17 but it has not established the standard for measuring
such a violation. In the absence of explicit standards, the circuit courts have tended to
establish a series of balancing tests that weigh the competing privacy interests and
government interests in order to determine when information privacy violations occur.18
In Falvo ex rel. Pletan v. Owasso Independent School District No. I-011,19 the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit weighed the plaintiff’s claim that peer grading and the
practice of calling out grades in class resulted in an impermissible release of her child’s
education records in violation of FERPA. The plaintiff also claimed that the practice of
peer grading violated her child’s constitutional right to privacy. Although the court, in a
holding that was later reversed by the Supreme Court,20 ruled that the practice of peer
grading violated FERPA, the Tenth Circuit denied the plaintiff’s constitutional claim. In
rejecting this claim, the court applied a three-part balancing test that considers “(1) if the
party asserting the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy, (2) if disclosure serves
a compelling state interest, and (3) if disclosure can be made in the least intrusive
manner.”21 Based on the first prong of this test, the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s
constitutional claim because it ruled that student’s school work and test grades were not
highly personal matters that deserved constitutional protection.22
Like peer graded student homework assignments, the release of student names,
addresses, and telephone numbers to military recruiters would probably not be viewed by
a court as violating a student’s constitutional right to privacy under such a balancing test.
Unlike Social Security numbers or medical records, for example, it is unlikely that a court
would hold that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the type of basic
contact information that is typically found in a phone book. Furthermore, the government
could argue persuasively that the release of such information serves a compelling state
interest in facilitating the maintenance of the nation’s armed forces. Finally, a court would
probably view the disclosure required by the NCLBA as minimally intrusive, given that
students can either opt out of the information release or decline to join the military, or
both.
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Ultimately, a court reviewing any privacy based challenge to the NCLBA military
recruitment provisions would be likely to reject such a claim, especially in light of the fact
that Congress was clearly acting within the scope of its constitutional authority when it
enacted the military recruitment provisions of the NCLBA. Under the Spending Clause
of the Constitution,23 Congress frequently promotes its policy goals by conditioning the
receipt of federal funds on state compliance with certain requirements. Indeed, the
Supreme Court “has repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenge the use of this
technique to induce governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal
policy,”24 and would likely uphold the NCLBA provisions in part on this basis.25
